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Abstract
In this paper we measure and analyse expenditure efficiency of Portuguese local
governments using a non-parametric technique for production frontier estimation known
as Free Disposal Hull. We first construct an index of municipal performance and then
compute input and output efficiency scores for 51 Portuguese municipalities located in
the region of Lisbon and Vale do Tejo (RLVT) in order to estimate the extent of
municipal spending that seems to be wasted relative to the best-practice frontier.
The results of our empirical analysis suggest that RLVT municipalities could achieve,
on average, roughly the same level of local output with about 39 percent fewer
resources, i.e. local performance could be improved without necessarily increasing
municipal spending.
JEL: C14, H72
Keywords: municipal expenditure, efficiency, production possibility frontier, FDH
                                                
1 The opinions expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the
authors employers. 
2 ISEG/UTL - Technical University of Lisbon, R. Miguel Lúpi 20, 1249-078 Lisbon, Portugal,
email: aafonso@iseg.utl.pt.
3 ISCSP/UTL  Technical University of Lisbon, Pólo Universitário do Alto da Ajuda, Rua G, 1345-
055 Lisbon, Portugal, email: sonfer1@sapo.pt.
2
Contents
1. Introduction .................................................................................................................. 3
2. Motivation and some stylised facts .............................................................................. 4
2.1. Theoretical motivation........................................................................................... 4
2.2. Some stylised facts for the Portuguese local sector............................................... 6
3. Analytical framework ................................................................................................. 10
3.1 Modelling local government production and measuring spending efficiency ..... 10
3.2 The FDH analysis ................................................................................................. 12
4. Non-parametric efficiency analysis of spending in RLVT......................................... 15
4.1 Total Municipal Performance (TMP) indicator.................................................... 15
4.2 Results of FDH analysis ....................................................................................... 21
5. Conclusion.................................................................................................................. 24
References ...................................................................................................................... 25
Annex  Data and Sources.............................................................................................. 29
3
1. Introduction
The debate over spending efficiency of local governments has been renewed with the
implementation of decentralisation policies designed to refocus public decision making
from central to municipal levels of government. The theoretical rational behind this
decentralisation supports that higher participation of local governments, in choosing the
use of public resources, allows for a better match between public services provision and
the needs and preferences of a heterogeneous citizenry. This type of outcome
additionally favours efforts to make government both more efficient and more
democratic and a more effective control of the overall growth of government (see
Marlow (1988) and Rowland (2001)).
We evaluate and analyse public expenditure efficiency of Portuguese municipal
governments via the interpretation of public sector activities as production processes
which transform inputs such as labour, capital, etc., in outputs/outcomes (Bradford,
Malt and Oates (1969) and Fisher (1996)). We use the Free Disposable Hull (FDH) non-
parametric methodology to compute input and output Farrel efficiency measures
(efficiency scores) for 51 Portuguese municipalities located in the region of Lisbon and
Vale do Tejo (RLVT) for 2001. This allows us to estimate the extent of municipal
spending that is wasteful relative to the best-practice frontier.
Our paper contributes to the literature by supplying new evidence concerning the
efficiency analysis of local government. Indeed, studies of local spending efficiency are
still not abundant in the economic literature and, as far as we know, are not available for
Portugal. We also construct a so-called Total Municipal Performance (TMP) index that
can in the future be extended to the entire set of Portuguese local governments.
This paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we give some further theoretical
motivation and provide some stylised facts about the institutional structure and the
revenue and expenditure components of the Portuguese local government sector. The
FDH analytical framework is briefly described in Section 3. In section 4 we address
data and measurement issues, and present and discuss the empirical results of the non-
parametric efficiency analysis. Section 5 summarises and suggests some conclusions.
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2. Motivation and some stylised facts
2.1. Theoretical motivation 
Given the role assigned to local governments, there are several reasons for quantifying
efficiency measures in order to assess the performance of local governments. Firstly,
they make possible the comparison across similar units and allow for the evaluation of
relative efficiency (Farrell (1957)). Secondly, if measurement reveals inefficiencies
among the units under evaluation, further analysis can be undertaken to explain them
(Lovell (1993, 2000), Kalirajan and Shand (1999)). Thirdly, the conclusions of such
analysis may have practical policy implications for the improvement of efficiency and it
may assist the public decision-making process (Lovell (1993)). Fourthly, as citizens at
large have the uneasy feeling that public resources are not always used in an efficient
and effective way (Moesen (1994)), it helps the application of general principles such
as accountability.4
These principles bind upon public sector institutions by giving to local residents and to
citizens in general, the information they need to effectively monitor and control their
political representatives to perform efficiently and pursue the local interests and
objectives motivating decentralisation processes. Finally, if we acknowledge that during
the last decade municipalities have been under increasing financial stress, along with the
general public government sector in most European countries, the efficiency of local
service provision can be seen, in this tight environment, as an alternative to
privatisation.
In spite of some recent theoretical and empirical developments of local sectors
economic analysis, the cornerstone of the theory of local finance is the Tiebout (1956)
model. Tiebout was the first author to apply the idea of competitive markets to the local
                                                
4 The complexity of such a concept is pointed out by several authors as, for example, Bird and
Vaillancourt (1999) and Blair (2000), to name such a few. This paper is particularly concerned with
one of the possible aspects of accountability, that one concerning the responsiveness of local
governments to their constituents and being perceived on the general argument that local residents
need information to effectively monitor and control their political representatives.
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government sector, arguing that from increased competition among local jurisdictions
local service will tend toward more Pareto-efficient provision. 5  
Embedded in the Tiebout hypothesis is the implicit assumption that local governments
employ local public resources in a cost-minimising way for local public interests.6
However, several authors (Schwab and Oates (1988, 1991), Davis and Hayes (1993)
and Deller (1992)) argue that local service provision also depends on factors other than
fiscal considerations (Musgrave and Musgrave (1989)), such as specific
characteristics of local residents.
Card and Kruegers (1992) and Kruegers (1997) empirical research demonstrates, for
example, that the levels of local provision of educational services strongly depend on
factors such as the composition of local communities. Schwab and Oates (1991)
defined an analytical model where several aspects related to the composition of the local
residents were explicitly controlled for, in order to identify the possible determinants of
optimal distribution of individuals between jurisdictions. They concluded that the
decentralisation of public responsibilities does not necessarily lead to an efficient
outcome. Other studies, concerned with the increasing devolution of public
responsibilities to local governments, also concluded for the reduced operational or
managerial capacity of local managers as being one factor that negatively influenced
the efficacy and efficiency of local decision-making processes (see Deller and Rudnicki
(1992)).
Additionally, public choice literature argues that inefficiencies may exist as a result of
the advancement of the private interests of interest groups. Indeed, if we approach the
local budgeting process as a representation of several principal-agent relationships
and envisage local politicians (agents) facing citizens and central government
                                                
5 In his model, the voting by feet mechanism is envisaged as a market-type solution for local
services provision. The local consumer/voter, having full knowledge about local revenue and
expenditure patterns, picks that community which best satisfies his preference pattern for public
goods moving to that community whose local government best satisfies his set of preferences
(Tiebout (1956)). This competitive process would imply a Pareto-efficient use of local resources,
had there been no costly mobility and if choice alternatives available to residents were unlimited
(Grossman, Mavros and Wassmer (1999)). 
6 Under his model, an optimum would result in terms of the number of residents for which the
services demanded for can be produced at the lowest average cost (Tiebout (1956)).
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(principals), one may argue that in principle there would be no scope for increasing
efficiency (Mueller (1989)).7 This would be true, had there been no self-interest among
local leaders (agents), and if there were no differences in objectives among principals
and agents (De Borger and Kerstens (2000)). The absence of scope for efficiency would
also hold if the principals had been fully informed about the true conditions of service
provision by their agents and could therefore effectively monitor the operations without
incurring in additional costs
2.2. Some stylised facts for the Portuguese local sector
To put our empirical analysis in perspective, we present some stylised facts about the
institutional structure, the revenue and expenditure components of Portuguese local
sector for 2001. The actual institutional setting of the Portuguese local government
sector was formally established in the 1976 Portuguese Constitution, approved after the
1974 Portuguese democratic revolution. In Figure 1 we illustrate the organisation of the
Portuguese Public Sector.
Figure 1. The organisation of the Portuguese Public Sector
                                                
7 The reasoning of this argument derives from bureaucracy inefficiency models (Niskanen, 1975),
and Migué and Bélanger (1974), where bureaucrats are presumed to have a tendency to develop their
own interests and to act as to maximize their total budget (Niskanen (1975)). This model predicts
that the common result from bureaucracy inefficient behaviour would be overspending (Hayes,
Razzolini, Ross (1998)). Migué and Bélanger (1974) also argue that bureaucrats behaviour would
lead to spending in excess of the production costs that were actually necessary to produce public
services, giving rise to inefficiencies or slack. 
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In Portugal there are currently 308 municipalities, 278 of which are located in Portugal
mainland and the remaining 30 are overseas municipalities, belonging to the islands of
Madeira and Azores. According to article 237 of 1976 Portuguese Constitution, local
governments are territorially based organisations with administrative and fiscal
autonomy. They have their own employees and patrimony and fiscal independence,
whose activity should be fine-tuned to satisfy local needs and should be concerned with
improving the well being of the population that live in their territories. 
Since 1976  the year the first municipal elections took place  there has been an
increasing devolution of powers from central to local governments. In fact, with Law
159/99, the last to be approved, the areas of intervention of municipalities and parishes
were further extended. Accordingly, they should promote social and economic
development, territory organisation, and supply local public goods such as water and
sewage, transports, housing, healthcare, education, culture, sports, defence of the
environment and protection of the civil population.  
According to the recently approved local finances Law (Law 42/98)8, Portuguese
municipalities have their own budgets, to which apply budgeting principles and rules,
some of which are also common to those binding the central government budget. As for
the budgetary process, in the end of each year the executive organ of the municipality
(town council) proposes to the legislative organ (municipal assembly) the local budget
and the plan of activities for the following year.
Municipal authorities are also subject to several control mechanisms by central
government agencies. These control mechanisms limit both their access to revenues and
their expenditure choices. In what concerns the former, local governments borrowing is
also under control from central government, which has been intensified during the last
years, mainly since 2002 for budget consolidation purposes, thus limiting in addition
their access to revenue. As for the latter, for example, personnel expenditures may not
exceed 60 per cent of their current expenditures. Local sector liabilities vis-à-vis the
                                                
8 The previous laws were the following: Law 1/79, Decree-Law 98/84 and Law 1/87.
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banking sector raised about 37% from 2000 to 2001, and according to the Banco de
Portugal estimates, local borrowing represented 5% of GDP in 2001 (see Table 1).
Table1. Gross and Net Local Administration Borrowing (mainland and islands)
1995-2001, Thousand euros
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Gross banking liabilities (a) (b) 724.8 790.4 988 1238 1428 1745 2382
Variation rate of gross banking
liabilities
65.6 197.4 249.8 190.3 317 637
             variation in percent 0.09 0.25 0.25 0.15 0.22 0.37
Deposits (a) (c) 382.6 489.2 471.4 667.4 688.4 663.5 731.9
Net banking liabilities 342.2 301.2 516.4 570.2 739.5 1081.3 1649.8
             in percent of GDP 0.4 0.3 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.9 1.3
Variation rate of net banking
liabilities
-41 215.2 53.8 169.3 341.9 568.4
Source: Banco de Portugal.
(a) Values in 31st of December.
(b) Borrowing from resident monetary financial institutions.
(c) Deposits in resident monetary financial institutions.
In what concerns the expenditure components of Portuguese mainland municipalities
for 20019, salaries accounted for about 24 per cent of total expenditures and 48 per cent
of their current expenditures.10
The relevance of those expenditure items limits local governments margin of
manoeuvre because they are regulated by rigid labour contracts. Employment duration
and wage rates are both defined by the central government. As a result we may
reasonably assume that there isnt much labour-input price variability within Portuguese
municipalities. 
As for the revenue components although in light of article 237 of Portuguese
Constitution municipalities are financially autonomous, their main sources of revenue
come largely from transfers that accounted for 44 per cent of their total revenues. 28 per
                                                
9 According to law 42/98 (Local Finances) and decree-law 54-A/99 (Local Accounting System)
municipal expenditures are divided between current expenditure (which include items such as
salaries, acquisitions of goods and services and interests, etc.) and capital expenditures. Capital
expenditures include, among others, investment expenditures implemented by the municipality in
those areas defined in law 159/99 and capital transfers to the counties (freguesias). Investment
expenditure is divided in four broad categories: (1) acquisition of land, (2) housing, (3) other
buildings (including sports, recreational and schooling infrastructures, social equipment and other),
and (4) diverse constructions. This last category comprises the following items: overpasses, streets
and complementary work; sewage; water pumping, treatment and distribution; rural roads; and
infrastructures for solid waste treatment.
10 For RLVT municipalities these expenditures represented, in 2001, 26% and 49% respectively.
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cent of these transfers corresponded to central government unconditional grants.11 On
the other hand, municipal direct taxes only represented 26 per cent of their total
revenues for the same year.12
 
For our purposes, we will here limit the observations to 51 Portuguese municipalities
located in the continental region of Lisbon and Vale do Tejo (RLVT). Although there
may be some disadvantages of limiting the present analysis only to RLVT
municipalities, there are two arguments motivating our choice. First, the 51 RLVT
municipalities represent about 37 per cent of total expenditures and revenues of all
municipalities located in Portugal mainland (see Table 2). Second, more detailed data is
available on a regional basis for fiscal year 2001, allowing us to further expand our
efficiency analysis. 





RLVT Share of 
RLVT
Total 6,128,804.09 2,263,975.44 0.37
        Current 3,008,689.71 1,196,054.13 0.40
             of which: 
             Personnel 1,455,862.98 587,065.46 0.40
        Capital 3,120,114.38 1,067,921.31 0.34
Expenditures
             of which: 
             Investment 2,492,804.85 850,974.47 0.34
Total 6,141,036.51 2,270,995.76 0.37
        Current 3,619,228.82 1,435,600.17 0.40
             of which: 
              Local Direct Taxes 1,583,430.99 786,333.78 0.50
Revenues
        Capital 2,521,807.69 835,395.59 0.33
Source: Direcção-Geral da Administração Local.
All in all, although law 42/98 may be considered a benchmark in the evolution process
of Portuguese local finances, there is still scope for improvement in Portuguese fiscal
decentralisation process. This is true particularly in order to establish an adequate
relationship between the decisions to increase [local] expenditures and the responsibility
for raising additional revenue (in particular through tax increases) (Bronchi (2003)).
                                                
11 For RLVT municipalities these values were respectively, 31% and 16%.
12 While for RLVT municipalities it amounted to 35% for the same year. For further discussion of
the local governments financing see Pereira (1998).
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3. Analytical framework
3.1 Modelling local government production and measuring spending efficiency
Our evaluation of local spending efficiency derives from microeconomic theory of
production, and it will be taken on the interpretation of local sector activities as
production processes, which transform inputs (such as labour, capital, etc.) in
outputs/outcomes. Consequently, we must prior translate the way local governments
transform inputs into outputs and select appropriate indicators.
Following Lovell (2000) and Bradford, Malt and Oates (1969), suppose that for a given
set of k=1,,K municipalities (producers), each employs a vector of N
inputs/resources, x= (x1, …, xN), to provide a set of D directly produced outputs13,
y= (y1, …, yD) through the development of activities with a variety of characteristics.  In
this simple framework (see Figure 2), process indicators would measure the efficiency
of municipal transformation process of primary inputs, such as labour and capital, into
activities capturing operational performance (see Borger and Kerstens (2000), and
Agrell and West 2001)).
Figure 2. Modelling local sector production process
Primary inputs Activities Direct Outputs Consumer Outputs Objectives












                                                
13 Local outputs may be generally categorised under the conceptual distinction proposed by
Bradford, Malt and Oates (1969) between direct local outputs and outcomes demanded by citizens.
These authors labelled the direct output as D-output and the outcomes demanded by citizens as
C-output. For example, for police services, municipalities provide surveillance and traffic control.
However, citizens ultimately care about safety and smoothness in the flow of travel (for other
examples, see Bradford, Malt, and Oates (1969)). Under their model, the transformation of D-
output into C-output is affected by environmental factors such as community composition. For
a concise explanation of this model, see Fisher (1996).
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Conversely, performance indicators measure how those activities are transformed into
direct outputs or results for consumption by citizens resulting from a comparison with
other comparable units (Agrell and West (2001)). If only input/output quantitative data
are available a technical approach is feasible (Lovell (2000)). Farrells technical
efficiency is then defined as the ability of a unit to produce the maximum possible
output from a given set of inputs, i.e., the ability to produce on its production possibility
frontier, for a given production technology. If, in addition, resources prices are also
available, an economic approach is also feasible (Lovell (2000))14.
The performance indicators defined above do not capture the effectiveness of municipal
service provision. In fact, if we consider the conceptual distinction proposed by
Bradford, Malt and Oates (1969) between D-Output and C-Output, one may argue that
citizens are more concerned about the outcomes/final results of the municipal activities
than in the directly produced outputs. Therefore, outputs may not necessarily reflect the
services desired by local residents.15 The ultimate outcome of these services is measured
by effect indicators, which reflect the degree to which direct outputs of municipal
activities translate into welfare improvements (de Borger and Kerstens (2000)). 
In line with Farrells definition of efficiency and recent literature we will herein assume
that municipal performance means the results/outcomes of local public policies, and
                                                
14 The performance of economic units is conventionally judged through the application of Farrells
(1957) economic efficiency concept as being composed by two components: (i) technical efficiency
and (ii) allocative efficiency. Accordingly, technical efficiency is defined as an economic unit
success in producing maximum output from a given set of inputs (Farrell (1957)), being measured
in terms of the physical relationship between observed output and the maximum attainable (feasible)
output for the observed inputs. Differently, allocative or price efficiency reflects an economic unit
success in choosing an optimal set of inputs (Farrell (1957)), i.e., the optimal choice of input
proportions, given their respective prices and the production technology. The way inputs are
combined to produce outputs is referred as technology of production. This can be represented by a
production function defining the maximum output(s) attainable from a given vector of inputs
(Coelli, Rao Battese (2002)), i.e., it specifies the possible input combinations to produce a given
level of output (Farrell (1957)).
15 According to Bradford, Malt and Oates (1969) model, C-Output depends both on the D-Output
provided by local governments and on the characteristics of the community and the population (Z),
factors often not directly controlled by local governments. For instance, When the citizen votes on a
police budget, however, he is primarily interested, not in the vector D, but rather in such things as
the degree of safety from criminal activity and the smoothness and rapidity of the flow of traffic. As
these depend only in part on D () and by certain environmental variables, such as the propensity
to riot in the community and the driving habits of local residents (Bradford, Malt and Oates
(1969)). 
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spending municipal efficiency as the outcome relative to the spending inputs.16
Accordingly, one possible method for assessing efficiency of local public expenditures
is to compare how well given expenditures (inputs) are transformed into local services.
For that purpose, municipal expenditure and performance data must be assembled upon
the basis of which one attempts to make inferences concerning the efficiency with
which these spending inputs are translated into local services.
3.2 The FDH analysis
As mentioned before, a possible method for assessing efficiency of local public
expenditures is to compare how well municipalities convert spending inputs into local
outputs. However, for measuring the level of municipal efficiency we must prior
estimate a production possibility frontier (PPF) of reference, relative to which each
individual decision-making unit (DMU)  in our case, municipalities- will be evaluated
in terms of how well it transforms spending inputs into outputs. This frontier will be
constructed with the help of a non-parametric technique for production frontier
estimation known as Free Disposal Hull (FDH), which reproduces the best combination
of results within our sample.17 Some few other studies that apply FDH analysis to assess
municipal spending efficiency include Eeckaut, Tulkens and Jamar (1993), De Borger et
al. (1994) and De Borger and Kerstens (1996a, b).18
The relative municipal efficiency will be measured by efficiency scores, which measure
the distance of individual observations relative to the estimated frontier. FDH analysis
provides, therefore, a framework for ranking the efficiency of municipalities through
comparison of their performance with the production frontier reflecting best practices.
The FDH analytical framework traces its origins to Farrell (1957) who developed an
index of technical efficiency measured as the maximum equi-proportionate reduction in
all inputs consistent with the production of observed outputs.19 Accordingly, a local
                                                
16 See, for example, Clements (2002), Tanzi and Schuknecht (2000), and Afonso, Schuknecht and
Tanzi (2003).
17 Deprins, Simar, and Tulkens (1984) first introduced the FDH technology. Eeckaut, Tulkens and
Jamar (1993), Fakin and Crombrugghe (1997), and Gupta and Verhoeven (2001) provide systematic
accounts of this approach.
18 For a review of the existing empirical studies, see De Borger and Kerstens (2000).
19 See Coelli, Rao, and Battese (2002).
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government can be technically inefficient if it is possible to provide the same level of
outputs with the employment of fewer input resources. Therefore, technical efficiency
reflects the ability of a DMU to produce along the production possibility frontier. If we
use local expenditures as inputs, the measurement of relative performance of local
governments may be labelled spending efficiency. Concerning the ability of local
governments to produce the maximum attainable output at the lowest possible cost
(expenditure), a local government is said to be input-inefficient relative to another local
government when it provides the same or an inferior level of services with higher
expenditures. Conversely, it will be said output-inefficient when, for a given level of
expenditures, it provides less of all outputs than another producer. 
As the maximum attainable output (or the frontier production function) is not directly
observable, one has to estimate the frontier using a sample of observed inputs consumed
and outputs produced as large and comparable as possible within the 51 municipalities
located in RLVT.  The procedure adopted in this paper is as follows. The first step was
to establish a production frontier that shows, for each level of expenditures, the highest
level of output (the best practices) observed among the municipalities in the sample.
Then we ranked the inefficient producers located in the interior of the production
possibility frontier according to their distance relative to estimated frontier.
The advantage of FDH analysis relative to other production frontier techniques is its
parsimonious approach to the construction of the production frontier.20 It does not
depend, in contrast to parametric techniques, on a previous specification of a production
function neither does it imply any restriction on the shape of the frontier, such as
convexity which is assumed in Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), another non-
parametric technique. FDH approach envelopes the available data through a frontier, the
only assumption of which is that inputs and outputs can be freely disposed of. For the
same production technology, a continuous production frontier or free disposal hull can
be established that maps any given input level with the highest possible level of output.
This assumption easily allows one both to identify directly (see Lovell (2000)) the best
practices in municipal spending. It allows evaluating the position of a particular
observation relative to these best practices, thus making FDH particularly convenient
                                                
20 See Lovell (1993) and Coelli, Rao, and Battese (2002).
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for the task at hand, where the DMUs in question are municipal authorities and the
output is local goods and services provided to the public.21
This approach has nevertheless also some disadvantages. Firstly, as a non-parametric
approach, the production frontier is more heavily influenced by and indeed determined
by (hence the categorisation as deterministic) outliers (see Eeckaut, Tulkens and Jamar
(1993)). Secondly, we should mention the weak vector dominance limitation. Within
the FDH methodology a given municipality is efficient by default when: it has the
lowest level of spending; it does not dominate nor is dominated by other municipalities;
or when there are no other comparable municipalities with better performance for at
least one output (Eeckaut, Tulkens and Jamar (1993)). Figure 3 is a graphical
representation of this problem, assuming the case of one input (x) and one output (y).
Figure 3. FDH possibility production frontier
In Figure 3, the segment line 1234 represents the FDH staircase frontier, corresponding
to efficient observations because they are not dominated by any other observation, i.e.,
for these observations there are no other comparable units producing the same level of
                                                
21 According to Agrell and West (2001), underlying every performance analysis is the indirect
assumption that the behaviour of the decision-making unit (DMU) is coherent with organisational
goals. Thus, if one assumes that the DMU may freely adjust the resources at his disposable to
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output, with at least the same or less inputs. They will be called un-dominated units
following Eeckaut, Tulkens and Jamar (1993).
For instance, unit 2 dominates unit 5 because the latter produces a higher level of output
(y) with less input (x). By the same reasoning, unit 7 is dominated by units 3 and 4,
whereas unit 3 dominates units 6 and 7. Now, if we consider unit 1 we directly observe
that it cannot be compared to other units because it does not dominate nor is dominated
by other units (this situation corresponds to the grey area in Figure 3). In fact, unit 1 it is
neither more nor less efficient than the other units and in FDH methodology it will be
declared efficient by default. Subsequently, and because it is unclear what is the exact
meaning of those municipalities that the FDH labels efficient by default, it should be
take into account that nothing can be said about the relative efficiency of those
municipalities (cfr. De Borger et al. (1994)). 
4. Non-parametric efficiency analysis of spending in RLVT 
4.1 Total Municipal Performance (TMP) indicator
We use a one input/one output approach for measuring municipal spending efficiency.
Accordingly, to proxy for the municipal resources consumption (input) induced by the
provision of municipal services, we take for each municipality its total per capita
expenditures registered on municipal accounts for year 2001.22
As a result, in our spending efficiency analysis we will not distinguish technical from
allocative efficiency. However, as the measurement of the latter requires price
information, while the former only requires quantity data (Lovell, 2000), selecting per
capita municipal spending gives us at least the guarantee that all inputs will be
considered in our analysis (De Borger and Kerstens (2000)). Additionally, this variable
is a more realistic municipal input measure (see Fisher (1996), De Borger and Kerstens
(2000) and Hayes, Razzolini and Ross (1998)) if we acknowledge the reduced margin of
                                                                                                                                              
accommodate given prices for input and outputs, the performance indexes may take technical, scale,
allocative and cost efficiency into consideration.
22 For instance Deller and Rudnicki (1992), on their empirical work about Maines public education
services, the price of the selected service administrative services was proxied by school
expenditures on administration per pupil variable.
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manoeuvre of Portuguese municipal authorities to influence current expenditure
choices, mainly those concerning municipal personnel salaries.
Concerning municipal outputs, we focus on global municipal performance stemming
form the municipal provision of specific services (e.g., waste collection, road lighting,
etc.). However, as we were confronted with the difficulty of directly measuring some of
the municipal production results, some performance indicators are surrogate measures
of municipal demand. For instance, the selected Total resident population and
Centrality index indicators are used to capture the needs of local authorities to provide
common basic administrative services, factors which are beyond the control of
individual municipal authorities (see Athanassopoulos (1995)).
The selection of indicators was based upon two general arguments implied within our
analysis. First, municipalities with similar demand for homogeneous services should
also have similar performance (see Eeckaut, Tulkens and Jamar (1993) and
Athanassopoulos (1995)). Second, performance of municipal governments can be
measured in terms of the improvement of observable factors directly controlled by
municipal governments during the time period under consideration. 
In Table 3 we describe the selected performance indicators used to quantitatively proxy
the results of individual municipal services provision. As suggested by several authors
(see, for example, De Borger and Kerstens (1996b), Afonso, Tanzi and Schuknecht
(2003)), to quantify a single municipal performance indicator all values of each sub-
indicator mentioned in Table 3 were normalised by setting the average equal to 1.
Then, we recalculate each sub-indicator relative to the overall average, giving them an
equal weight. Finally, these sub-indicators were grouped under four five broader




Table 3. Sample output/outcome measures for selected municipal services
D-Output C-Output








Total resident population Total municipal resident
population is used to




See Eeckaut, Tulkens and














Following De Borger et
al.(1994), we included this
proxy  of municipal
services delivered to non-
residents. 
(*) Natural Logarithm.
Education Basic Education School 
buildings per capita
This indicator was
calculated as the number
of nursery and primary
school buildings in percent
of the total number of
corresponding school-age
persons.
Education attainment This indicator is proxied
by the gross enrolment
ratio in nursery and
primary education as the
number of enrolled
students in percent of the
total number of
corresponding school-age







with ≥ 65 years old
This indicator gives us the
number of senior citizens,
reflecting the supply of
municipal social services
to the elderly such as
home-based general
assistance, retirement
houses, etc. See Eeckaut,
Tulkens and Jamar (1993)
















% Population served with
solid waste collection
% Buildings with solid
waste collection
















Adapted from Fisher (1996).
The municipal performance indexes and the Total Municipal Performance (TMP)
indicator are reported in Table 4 (data sources are reported in the Annex). 
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ABRANTES 0,622 0,968 1,203 0,903 0,863 0,912
ALCANENA 0,215 0,943 1,403 0,267 0,877 0,741
ALCOBAÇA 0,816 0,976 1,072 0,853 0,844 0,912
ALCOCHETE 0,192 1,042 0,667 0,180 0,842 0,584
ALENQUER 0,577 1,030 0,971 0,610 0,894 0,816
ALMADA 2,370 1,036 0,666 2,430 1,234 1,547
ALMEIRIM 0,324 0,965 0,833 0,384 0,879 0,677
ALPIARÇA 0,118 0,968 0,846 0,167 0,751 0,570
AMADORA 2,591 1,034 0,555 2,220 1,168 1,514
ARRUDA DOS VINHOS 0,152 1,016 1,025 0,165 0,739 0,619
AZAMBUJA 0,307 0,996 0,802 0,348 0,693 0,629
BARREIRO 1,164 1,007 0,678 1,126 0,865 0,968
BENAVENTE 0,343 1,025 0,704 0,309 0,891 0,654
BOMBARRAL 0,196 0,971 1,466 0,259 0,777 0,734
CADAVAL 0,205 0,980 1,421 0,295 0,695 0,719
CALDAS DA RAINHA 0,720 1,010 1,057 0,794 0,857 0,888
CARTAXO 0,345 0,994 0,786 0,385 0,735 0,649
CASCAIS 2,515 1,036 0,696 2,323 1,955 1,705
CHAMUSCA 0,169 0,946 1,410 0,238 0,781 0,709
CONSTÂNCIA 0,056 0,991 2,042 0,067 0,935 0,818
CORUCHE 0,314 0,935 1,416 0,480 0,665 0,762
ENTRONCAMENTO 0,268 1,033 0,653 0,236 0,914 0,621
FERREIRA DO ZÊZERE 0,139 0,954 2,141 0,234 0,720 0,838
GOLEGÃ 0,084 0,955 0,803 0,115 0,943 0,580
LISBOA 8,320 1,034 0,936 12,024 3,418 5,146
LOURES 2,933 1,031 0,589 2,200 1,657 1,682
LOURINHÃ 0,343 0,992 1,198 0,369 0,890 0,758
MAFRA 0,801 1,042 0,922 0,764 0,798 0,865
MOITA 0,994 1,016 0,603 0,784 0,853 0,850
MONTIJO 0,577 1,005 0,762 0,613 0,749 0,741
NAZARÉ 0,222 0,938 0,877 0,227 0,917 0,636
ÓBIDOS 0,160 0,991 1,508 0,199 0,905 0,753
ODIVELAS 1,972 1,031 0,595 1,446 1,661 1,341
OEIRAS 2,389 1,047 0,501 2,179 1,629 1,549
OURÉM 0,681 0,976 1,359 0,776 0,699 0,898
PALMELA 0,786 1,043 0,643 0,726 0,940 0,828
PENICHE 0,402 0,958 0,927 0,411 0,809 0,701
RIO MAIOR 0,311 0,972 1,453 0,349 0,753 0,768
SALVATERRA DE MAGOS 0,297 0,982 0,756 0,343 0,676 0,611
SANTARÉM 0,937 0,991 1,106 1,177 0,964 1,035
SARDOAL 0,060 0,933 2,166 0,102 0,815 0,815
SEIXAL 2,214 1,050 0,483 1,364 1,283 1,279
SESIMBRA 0,554 1,068 0,606 0,497 0,848 0,715
SETÚBAL 1,679 1,016 0,575 1,518 1,703 1,298
SINTRA 5,359 1,067 0,501 3,365 1,524 2,363
SOBRAL DE MONTE AGRAÇO 0,132 1,020 1,082 0,145 0,803 0,636
TOMAR 0,544 0,970 1,324 0,839 0,740 0,883
TORRES NOVAS 0,544 0,975 1,368 0,695 0,771 0,870
TORRES VEDRAS 1,065 1,000 1,064 1,133 0,822 1,017
VILA FRANCA DE XIRA 1,811 1,043 0,527 1,225 0,961 1,114
VILA NOVA DA BARQUINHA 0,112 1,004 1,251 0,140 0,894 0,680
Mean 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000
Standard deviation 1,452 0,036 0,418 1,738 0,459 0,693
Minimum 0,056 0,933 0,483 0,067 0,665 0,570
Maximum 8,320 1,068 2,166 12,024 3,418 5,146
1/ The underlined municipalities (19) belong to the Lisbon Metropolitan Area, formally created by law 44/91.
2/ Each sub-indicator contributes with an equal weight (1/5) for the Total Municipal Performance indicator.
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The municipal performance sub-indicators reported in Table 3 suggest the existence of
large differences in performance across municipalities belonging to our sample, mainly
for general administrative services provided to local residents proxied by Total
Population sub-indicator and for social services proxied by Population with ≥ 65
years old sub-indicator. It is also interesting to notice that Lisbon is best in these two
services and that Sintra is also in both cases the second-best municipality. 
As expected, the highest values for Centrality Index sub-indicator 23 are recorded in
those municipalities that belong to the Lisbon Metropolitan Area. On one hand, the sub-
indicator Present population divided by total Resident population mainly favoured
non-metropolitan municipalities performance, such as Constância and Ferreira do
Zêzere. On the other hand, it was the other sub-indicator (Resident population who
came from other municipalities divided by total Resident Population), which was
determinant in identifying the best performers for Centrality Index, such as
Sesimbra, Sintra, Seixal and Oeiras metropolitan municipalities. 
We may interpret these findings as follows. First, if those municipalities, which strongly
suffer from seasonal population movements for location specific reasons, as Constância
and Ferreira do Zêzere, Rio Maior and Lisbon, finance their services mainly through
taxation it may be the case that local residents subsidise the consumption of local
services by non-residents. If instead of taxation, local services where mainly financed
through user charges the spill over effect or the indirect subsidisation element would
be reduced (see De Borger et al. (1994) and Cullis and Jones (1998)). Second, we may
hypothesise that mobile citizens/consumers tend to move into those communities that
have a bundle of services that best match their own preferences (see Tiebout (1956)).
Then, we may also argue (see Grossman, Mavros and Wassmer (1999) that Sesimbra,
Sintra, Seixal and Oeiras metropolitan municipalities were successful in terms of being
perceived by mobile consumers as effective substitutes for other communities
including central metropolitan city. Additionally, although metropolitan areas face more
                                                
23 The Centrality Index is computed using two ratios: first, by the ratio between mobile present
population in a municipality and its resident population and second, the ratio between local
residents that came from other municipalities and resident population for the municipality in
question.
20
costly demands from either residents and non-residents, they favour from factors such
as greater economies of scale deriving from an enlarged population served by -and thus,
able to contribute to- for such investments (see Rowland (2000)), unlike non-
metropolitan municipalities 
Education performance is best in Sardoal, followed by Ferreira do Zêzere and
Constância, all three municipalities belonging to the statistical area of Médio Tejo
(NUT III), and within the tenth best municipalities for education performance none
belongs to Lisbon Metropolitan Area.
Although registering the highest values in School buildings per pupil sub-indicator for
education services, Ferreira do Zêzere, Constância and Sardoal municipalities also have
the lowest number for Residents with ≤ 9 years old sub-indicator for the same
services. In fact, we noticed that the tenth youngest municipalities within RLVT belong
to the Lisbon Metropolitan Area. With the exception of Lisbon it is also in Lisbon
Metropolitan Areas municipalities where the tenth lowest values both for School
enrolment and School buildings per capita sub-indicators for educational services
were observed. These findings suggest further investigation in order to answer the
following question: Does the low performance in Education observed in these
municipalities derive from under-provision relative to the respective demand or from a
decreasing demand for education services?
Sanitation & Environment performance is highest in Lisbon, followed by capital
Cascais and Oeiras. Notice that within the tenth best in the provision of these
services, all of them correspond to Lisbon Metropolitan Areas municipalities. 
Finally, in what concerns the total municipal performance indicator (TMP), we notice
that Lisbon Metropolitan Areas municipalities lead with the tenth highest values, with
Lisbon scoring with the highest of all (5.146), followed by Sintra (2.363), and Alpiarça
with the smallest one (0.570).
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4.2 Results of FDH analysis
We now compute the efficiency scores for the 51 Portuguese municipalities located in
Lisbon and Vale do Tejo Region (RLVT) with the help of the FDH methodology. This
allows us to estimate the extent of municipal spending that is wasteful relative to the
best-practice frontier, measured as the distance of individual observations relative to
that frontier.
We use one input, measured by total per capita municipal expenditures (x) and one
output given by the Total Municipal Performance (y) indicator previously computed
(see Table 4). The production possibility frontier (PPF) for our set of municipalities is
presented in Figure 4, through which we can observe that the most efficient RLVT
municipalities, positioned along the PPF, are Lisbon, Sintra, Seixal and Caldas da
Rainha. It is also possible to see that municipalities such as Golegã, Alpiarça,
Chamusca, Sardoal and Constância are located well inside the PPF.













0 100 200 300 400 500
Constância Sardoal Chamusca
   Alpiarça  Golegã
y
x
Notes: y  Total Municipal Performance (TMP) indicator;
            x  Total annual per capita expenditure (euros).
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The results for the input and output efficiency scores, along with each municipalitys
ranking, are presented in Table 5. We observe that input efficiency scores start at 0.17
(for Constância) and output efficiency scores start at 0.16 (for Contância and Sardoal).
The average input efficiency score is 0.61, suggesting the municipalities could achieve
on average roughly the same level of local output with about 39 per cent fewer
resources, i.e., that local performance could be improved without necessarily increasing
municipal spending.
Two interesting patterns are indicated in Table 5. First, big municipalities (those
municipalities with per capita expenditures levels above the +/2 limit), tend to have
lower efficiency scores than small municipalities (those with per capita expenditures
levels below the +/2 threshold). Secondly, metropolitan municipalities, which were
formally created by law 44/91, enjoy greater efficiency in the use of municipal
resources than their non-metropolitan counterparts.
From Table 5 we actually observe some interesting variations in individual ranking
positions when first considering input and then output efficiency results. For instance,
non-metropolitan municipalities such as Entroncamento, Salvaterra de Magos, and
Nazaré, strongly decrease their relative ranking positions when measuring output
efficiency compared to theirs in input efficiency results. On the other hand,
municipalities such as Setúbal, Rio Maior and Cascais strongly improve their relative
ranking when one considers output efficiency instead of input efficiency.
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Table 5. Efficiency scores in 2001 and Total Municipal Performance indicator
Input efficiency Output efficiencyMunicipalities
Score Rank Score Rank
ABRANTES 0,53 32 0,39 17
ALCANENA 0,36 46 0,31 31
ALCOBAÇA 0,94 5 0,39 16
ALCOCHETE 0,49 36 0,25 47
ALENQUER 0,58 25 0,35 25
ALMADA 0,76 13 0,65 8
ALMEIRIM 0,45 41 0,29 38
ALPIARÇA 0,32 48 0,24 49
AMADORA 0,76 14 0,64 9
ARRUDA DOS VINHOS 0,48 37 0,26 45
AZAMBUJA 0,43 43 0,27 43
BARREIRO 0,83 8 0,41 15
BENAVENTE 0,54 30 0,28 39
BOMBARRAL 0,71 16 0,31 32
CADAVAL 0,67 19 0,30 33
CALDAS DA RAINHA 1,00 1 1,00 1
CARTAXO 0,63 22 0,27 40
CASCAIS 0,58 24 0,72 5
CHAMUSCA 0,30 49 0,30 35
CONSTÂNCIA 0,17 51 0,16 50
CORUCHE 0,51 34 0,32 27
ENTRONCAMENTO 0,72 15 0,26 44
FERREIRA DO ZÊZERE 0,56 29 0,35 23
GOLEGÃ 0,38 45 0,25 48
LISBOA 1,00 1 1,00 1
LOURES 0,79 10 0,71 6
LOURINHÃ 0,52 33 0,32 28
MAFRA 0,47 39 0,37 21
MOITA 0,84 7 0,36 22
MONTIJO 0,47 38 0,31 30
NAZARÉ 0,66 20 0,27 42
ÓBIDOS 0,38 44 0,32 29
ODIVELAS 0,79 11 0,57 10
OEIRAS 0,58 26 0,66 7
OURÉM 0,76 12 0,38 18
PALMELA 0,50 35 0,35 24
PENICHE 0,66 21 0,30 36
RIO MAIOR 0,35 47 0,32 26
SALVATERRA DE MAGOS 0,67 18 0,26 46
SANTARÉM 0,70 17 0,44 13
SARDOAL 0,22 50 0,16 51
SEIXAL 1,00 1 1,00 1
SESIMBRA 0,43 42 0,30 34
SETÚBAL 0,47 40 0,55 11
SINTRA 1,00 1 1,00 1
SOBRAL DE MONTE AGRAÇO 0,54 31 0,27 41
TOMAR 0,59 23 0,37 19
TORRES NOVAS 0,57 27 0,37 20
TORRES VEDRAS 0,92 6 0,43 14
VILA FRANCA DE XIRA 0,82 9 0,47 12
VILA NOVA DA BARQUINHA 0,56 28 0,29 37
Average 0.61 0.41
Metropolitan municipalities * 0.68 0.56
Non-metropolitan municipalities 0.56 0.33
< 106.75 0,81 0,51
[106.75 167.92] 0,53 0,36
Per capita
spending intervals
** >167.92 0,39 0,34
* Underlined municipalities.
** Limits are computed with the following values: ]0;[, [;] and ]; +inf[, where
=137.33 and =61.17.
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One distinguishable feature between the above mentioned two groups of municipalities
could be pointed out. Municipalities that perform better in terms of input efficiency,
despite of registering on average levels of per capita expenditures 38 per cent below the
overall average sample (137,33), report also, on average, a total performance indicator
equivalent to 0.62, well below the average sample (1.0). Municipalities belonging to the
latter group, despite of having on average levels of per capita expenditures 27 per cent
above the overall sample average, also report on average a total performance indicator
equal to 1.26, considerably higher than the former subset and also superior to the overall
average sample (1.0).
An interesting result of our efficiency analysis is that, if instead of municipal per capita
expenditures we had used total municipal expenditures as input measure, the average
output efficiency score would have risen. Furthermore, a higher number of
municipalities would be labelled efficient, but also would be higher the number of those
declared efficient by default. This somehow implies means that this per capita size
dimension implicit in our selected input measure is less conservative, and that it also
captures better the uncontrollable demand-based dynamics of local provision. 
5. Conclusion
In this paper we assessed the spending efficiency of the 51 RLVT municipalities. We
first constructed a composite indicator of municipal performance, Total Municipal
Performance index. Using that municipal performance indicator as an output measure
and municipal per capita expenditure as the input measure, we then applied the FDH
methodology to the data set. 
The efficiency results measured in terms of input and output efficiency scores suggest
that, on average, RLVT municipalities could be characterised as being relatively
inefficient. Among the 51 municipalities assessed we found that they could have
achieved, on average, roughly the same level of local output with about 39 percent
fewer resources, i.e., that local performance could be improved without necessarily
increasing municipal spending.
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Considering both individual efficiency scores and ranking positions, we concluded that
the results reveal a wide dispersion in performance of RLVT municipalities. Only 4
RLVT municipalities are considered to be efficient, of which only one (Lisbon) is
declared efficient by default under the FDH methodology. Furthermore, we also
found that wasted municipal spending in RLVT is, on average, higher within big
municipalities, vis-à-vis average or smaller municipalities. Additionally, a higher
degree of inefficiency seems to exist in the sub-set of non-metropolitan municipalities
belonging to our sample.
Our results support the general argument that more spending does not necessarily
translate into better local living standards. One may hypothesise that the actual
Portuguese decentralisation process must be endowed of a rationale that promotes the
improvement of spending efficiency based on comparison of Portuguese municipalities
with clearly identified best practices benchmarks.
Concerning future work avenues, further analysis work could be done using also an
alternative methodology (for instance Data Envelopment Analysis), as well as a more
detailed approach could also be followed by using several inputs and several outputs, in
order to check for the robustness of the results.24 Finally, the current paper could
eventually be extended to the entire universe of the Portuguese municipalities or to
other sub-samples of that universe.
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Annex – Data and Sources























ABRANTES 42235 3507 1660 463 74 10008 40488
ALCANENA 14600 1302 606 275 33 2961 13957
ALCOBAÇA 55376 5831 2773 713 101 9459 56037
ALCOCHETE 13010 1410 548 142 11 2000 12596
ALENQUER 39180 4158 1708 552 65 6763 38061
ALMADA 160825 14891 7808 813 82 26945 156027
ALMEIRIM 21957 2078 991 249 21 4260 20880
ALPIARÇA 8024 688 311 109 7 1854 7754
AMADORA 175872 17144 8000 589 71 24611 168219
ARRUDA DOS VINHOS 10350 1041 386 139 19 1826 10105
AZAMBUJA 20837 1964 899 36 24 3856 20842
BARREIRO 79012 6723 3643 512 33 12484 74717
BENAVENTE 23257 2659 1217 312 18 3428 22214
BOMBARRAL 13324 1268 688 270 32 2874 12922
CADAVAL 13943 1225 531 207 34 3271 13603
CALDAS DA RAINHA 48846 5054 2425 647 84 8804 48330
CARTAXO 23389 2168 970 239 21 4270 22442
CASCAIS 170683 17019 9251 695 107 25757 164987
CHAMUSCA 11492 870 497 180 20 2638 11119
CONSTÂNCIA 3815 359 250 113 13 741 4622
CORUCHE 21332 1614 882 270 40 5323 20305
ENTRONCAMENTO 18174 2058 933 240 11 2613 17113
FERREIRA DO ZÊZERE 9422 803 445 188 36 2591 9781
GOLEGÃ 5710 518 215 85 5 1279 5440
LISBOA 564657 42422 30100 4200 335 133304 562692
LOURES 199059 20824 9019 1280 111 24394 191008
LOURINHÃ 23265 2432 1232 394 47 4094 22831
MAFRA 54358 5926 2334 724 88 8468 53097
MOITA 67449 7338 3431 407 37 8691 64245
MONTIJO 39168 3922 2025 249 33 6792 38170
NAZARÉ 15060 1451 801 128 15 2514 14596
ÓBIDOS 10875 1003 390 193 31 2204 10682
ODIVELAS 133847 12896 6264 672 57 16034 127817
OEIRAS 162128 15024 5989 495 64 24153 156197
OURÉM 46216 5055 2406 947 123 8600 45443
PALMELA 53353 5754 2389 219 46 8051 51696
PENICHE 27315 2786 1444 303 34 4555 26353
RIO MAIOR 21110 2107 857 433 60 3864 21473
SALVATERRA DE MAGOS 20161 1882 932 178 15 3806 19331
SANTARÉM 63563 5811 2765 849 103 13049 62563
SARDOAL 4104 342 192 101 15 1136 4102
SEIXAL 150271 16773 6929 429 59 15127 145287
SESIMBRA 37567 4190 1831 219 25 5513 37287
SETÚBAL 113934 11681 5673 476 48 16825 109698
SINTRA 363749 46284 18311 1882 191 37311 345669
SOBRAL DE MONTE AGRAÇO 8927 925 394 92 18 1613 8827
TOMAR 36908 3996 2004 805 89 9303 41988
TORRES NOVAS 36908 3289 1647 492 82 7705 35971
TORRES VEDRAS 72250 7473 3494 995 127 12564 70892
VILA FRANCA DE XIRA 122908 13696 5603 668 60 13586 117414
VILA NOVA DA BARQUINHA 7610 696 265 144 16 1555 7698
Average 67870 6712 3262 510 57 11087 65992
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ABRANTES 92 1799 98 60 75 98   433
ALCANENA 99 595 100 72 72 100   197
ALCOBAÇA 94 2399 100 65 65 96   270
ALCOCHETE 94 2230 97 50 90 98   258
ALENQUER 94 4474 98 87 93 100   0
ALMADA 89 15285 100 33 98 100  3 555
ALMEIRIM 94 1092 99 81 85 98   72
ALPIARÇA 96 553 100 8 98 100   49
AMADORA 96 16046 100 99 100 100  1 837
ARRUDA DOS VINHOS 93 1283 98 24 72 98   58
AZAMBUJA 90 1599 98 0 79 99   39
BARREIRO 98 5428 100 0 88 100  1 135
BENAVENTE 93 2791 98 80 95 100   86
BOMBARRAL 93 824 100 26 90 100   100
CADAVAL 94 964 98 0 78 98   22
CALDAS DA RAINHA 91 3804 99 70 78 100   168
CARTAXO 94 1740 94 7 92 98   150
CASCAIS 95 16043 100 0 98 100  9 674
CHAMUSCA 90 523 99 54 54 100   85
CONSTÂNCIA 99 370 100 95 95 100   60
CORUCHE 88 684 95 6 55 98   48
ENTRONCAMENTO 99 2620 100 70 99 100   257
FERREIRA DO ZÊZERE 87 485 95 13 95 95   72
GOLEGÃ 97 374 100 98 100 100   56
LISBOA 97 39577 97 90 100 100  19 750
LOURES 94 16713 99 90 98 100  5 911
LOURINHÃ 96 1662 98 65 96 100   270
MAFRA 92 7094 100 16 69 98   646
MOITA 95 5536 100 7 95 100   911
MONTIJO 93 3017 85 0 78 97   690
NAZARÉ 88 563 100 95 95 100   92
ÓBIDOS 94 939 99 92 92 100   0
ODIVELAS 96 12228 99 90 98 100  5 464
OEIRAS 98 18821 99 99 99 100   414
OURÉM 94 2126 100 8 20 100   650
PALMELA 79 7081 95 90 90 100   424
PENICHE 98 1121 100 10 98 100   0
RIO MAIOR 97 1111 99 45 45 98   0
SALVATERRA DE MAGOS 98 1311 95 6 57 95  1 097
SANTARÉM 93 3442 100 68 70 98   0
SARDOAL 98 218 96 64 64 100  3 731
SEIXAL 96 18859 99 40 98 100   538
SESIMBRA 97 7802 98 50 56 100  7 583
SETÚBAL 93 8233 99 10 97 100  4 680
SINTRA 96 54149 98 98 98 100   110
SOBRAL DE MONTE AGRAÇO 98 1202 99 50 60 100   406
TOMAR 90 1846 93 35 35 95   202
TORRES NOVAS 90 1803 98 37 67 97   371
TORRES VEDRAS 93 4363 100 35 84 99  1 813
VILA FRANCA DE XIRA 91 14096 100 5 99 100   56
VILA NOVA DA BARQUINHA 91 840 100 88 88 100 0
Average 94 6270 96 49 82 99 1461
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ABRANTES 6,114,490 42,235 144.77
ALCANENA 2,766,525 14,600 189.49
ALCOBAÇA 4,520,008 55,376 81.62
ALCOCHETE 1,796,983 13,010 138.12
ALENQUER 4,636,211 39,180 118.33
ALMADA 16,375,555 160,825 101.82
ALMEIRIM 3,359,138 21,957 152.99
ALPIARÇA 1,693,792 8,024 211.09
AMADORA 18,007,625 175,872 102.39
ARRUDA DOS VINHOS 1,488,478 10,350 143.81
AZAMBUJA 3,347,553 20,837 160.65
BARREIRO 7,308,873 79,012 92.50
BENAVENTE 2,943,741 23,257 126.57
BOMBARRAL 1,276,831 13,324 95.83
CADAVAL 1,425,209 13,943 102.22
CALDAS DA RAINHA 3,337,987 48,846 68.34
CARTAXO 2,543,852 23,389 108.76
CASCAIS 22,872,254 170,683 134.00
CHAMUSCA 2,639,634 11,492 229.69
CONSTÂNCIA 1,566,944 3,815 410.73
CORUCHE 2,885,555 21,332 135.27
ENTRONCAMENTO 1,719,887 18,174 94.63
FERREIRA DO ZÊZERE 1,151,470 9,422 122.21
GOLEGÃ 1,024,954 5,710 179.50
LISBOA 134,846,612 564,657 238.81
LOURES 19,487,624 199,059 97.90
LOURINHÃ 3,085,737 23,265 132.63
MAFRA 7,914,218 54,358 145.59
MOITA 5,505,204 67,449 81.62
MONTIJO 5,667,476 39,168 144.70
NAZARÉ 1,555,556 15,060 103.29
ÓBIDOS 1,933,640 10,875 177.81
ODIVELAS 13,149,650 133,847 98.24
OEIRAS 21,923,409 162,128 135.22
OURÉM 4,619,062 46,216 99.95
PALMELA 7,337,834 53,353 137.53
PENICHE 2,829,910 27,315 103.60
RIO MAIOR 4,084,613 21,110 193.49
SALVATERRA DE MAGOS 2,042,723 20,161 101.32
SANTARÉM 6,942,804 63,563 109.23
SARDOAL 1,303,958 4,104 317.73
SEIXAL 11,485,598 150,271 76.43
SESIMBRA 5,957,457 37,567 158.58
SETÚBAL 18,930,255 113,934 166.15
SINTRA 28,309,768 363,749 77.83
SOBRAL DE MONTE AGRAÇO 1,136,346 8,927 127.29
TOMAR 4,294,131 36,908 116.35
TORRES NOVAS 4,435,751 36,908 120.18
TORRES VEDRAS 5,974,879 72,250 82.70
VILA FRANCA DE XIRA 11,402,685 122,908 92.77
VILA NOVA DA BARQUINHA 925,876 7,610 121.67
Average 8,899,732 67,870 137.33
Standard deviation 19,154,701 98,560 61.17
Minimum 925,876 3,815 68.34
Maximum 134,846,612 564,657 410.73
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Table A3. Data sources
Data Source
Basic administrative services
provided to local residents
Total resident population 1/
Basic services provided to non-
residents
LN Present population divided by LN Resident population 1/
LN Resident population who came from other municipalities 
divided by LN Resident Population
1/
Basic Education School building capacity 2/ 
Gross pre-primary and primary school enrolment 2/
Social services Local residents with ≥ 65 years old 1/ 
Water supply % Population with clean water 3/
% Population with draining water systems 3/
% Population with water treatment stations 3/
Solid waste collection % Population served with solid waste collection 3/
% Buildings with solid waste collection per square mile 1/
Environment protection Recycled Materials given or sold 3/
Total Municipal Expenditures Expenditures in 2001 4/
1/ INE, Recenseamento Geral da População e Habitação - 2001 (Resultados Definitivos).
2/ INE, Estatísticas preliminares, ano lectivo 2000/2001.
3/ INE, Estatísticas do Ambiente, 2000, in: Anuários Estísticos Regionais, 2001.
4/ Municipal Annual Accounts, 2001, in: Comissão de Coordenação da Região de Lisboa e Vale do Tejo
